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I. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from an Order Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment for Plaintiff dated December 9, 1994, an Order 
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated October 
26, 1995, and a Judgment of Specific Performance dated December 
14, 1995. This Court is vested with jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1995). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of the Dispute, 
Plaintiff/appellee, Robert D. Walter (hereinafter 
"Walter"), brought this action for an order compelling the 
defendants/appellants, Ria and James Berkus (hereinafter 
"Berkuses"), to convey to him their interest in a parcel of 
real property located in Summit County, Utah. The Berkuses 
moved for summary judgment on the ground that there was no 
contract between the parties since the Berkuses allegedly 
revoked their counteroffer prior to Walter's acceptance. 
Walter moved for summary judgment on the ground that he 
accepted the counteroffer before the Berkuses notified him of 
their revocation. The Court, in two separate proceedings 
before two separate judges, granted summary judgment to Walter 
196U03494 4 1 
on his claim for specific performance. The Court found that no 
reasonable minds could differ as to the fact that Walter 
accepted the Berkuses' counteroffer before there was a valid 
revocation. 
B, Appellants' Mischaracterization of "Facts". 
The Berkuses characterize several matters as "fact" 
which are not supported by the record. Those matters are as 
follows: 
1. The Berkuses state as fact that "Mr. and 
Mrs. Olches' assistant at the brokerage house was Kate 
Doordan." This is a mischaracterization of the facts. Janet 
Olch, Jon Olch and Kate Doordan testified that Ms. Doordan 
served as a secretary/receptionist for Bald Eagle Realty. (R. 
at 685-87.) Ms. Doordan was employed by Bald Eagle Realty 
under contract and received no compensation from Janet Olch. 
(id.) Ms. Doordan's employment was supervised by Jon Olch, and 
she was paid by Bald Eagle Realty, a brokerage company owned by 
Jon Olch. (Id.) 
2. The Berkuses state as fact that "the scope 
of Ms. Doordan's duties for Mrs. Olch were broad." Again, this 
is a mischaracterization. Kate Doordan served as a secretary/ 
receptionist for Bald Eagle Realty. She did not work for Janet 
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Olch. Any services performed by Ms. Doordan on behalf of Janet 
Olch were gratuitous in nature. (Id.) 
3. The Berkuses state as fact that Mr. Berkus' 
call to "the brokerage company was answered by Doordan -- Mrs. 
Olch's assistant." Again, Kate Doordan was not employed as 
Janet Olch's assistant. (Id.) 
4. The Berkuses state as fact that their 
telephone call with Kate Doordan "lasted for six minutes, 
terminating at 2:07 p.m." The Berkuses have mischaracterized 
the record. The evidence shows that the telephone call began 
at 2:02 p.m., and lasted for six minutes. A telephone call 
that begins at 2:02 and lasts six minutes ends at 2:08. 
5. The Berkuses state as fact that Kate 
Doordan "called Mr. Olch at 2:07 p.m. (MST)1 from Park City." 
There is no evidence in the record to support this statement. 
6. The Berkuses correctly state as fact that 
Janet Olch had a "sense of urgency about getting Walter's 
signed acceptance back from Ohio." However, the Berkuses 
failed to disclose the fact that Janet Olch's "sense of 
urgency" was the same as had been with her other closings. (R. 
at 666.) 
XA11 references to time of day are in the Mountain Standard 
Time Zone. 
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7. The Berkuses state as fact that Kate 
Doordan faxed a copy of the Berkuses' revocation notice to 
Walter's "administrative assistant." This is a conclusion that 
is not supported by the record. The evidence shows that the 
revocation notice was faxed to Katie Jenkins, an employee of 
Cardinal Health. Ms. Jenkins is not Walter's administrative 
assistant for purposes of personal transactions. (R. at 524.) 
C. Additional Facts to be Considered. 
1. On January 26, 1994, the Berkuses' 
attorney, Ronald Lyster, faxed the counteroffer to Jon Olch. 
Jon Olch then delivered the counteroffer to Janet Olch, who in 
turn faxed it to Walter. (R. at 124-25.) 
2. On Thursday, January 27, 1994, at 1:55 
p.m., Walter notified Janet Olch that he had accepted the 
counteroffer "as is". Approximately 15 minutes later, Janet 
informed Jon Olch of Walter's acceptance. (R. at 125.) Walter 
then faxed his signed acceptance to Janet at 3:12 p.m. (Id.) 
Approximately ten minutes later, Janet informed Jon that she 
had received Walter's signed acceptance. Jon then informed 
Janet that there was a problem because the Berkuses wanted to 
withdraw their counteroffer for 24 hours. (R. at 126, 512-13 & 
517-18.) 
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3. On Monday, January 31, 1994, Walter wired 
$50,000 into the escrow account of High County Title as earnest 
money to secure his performance under the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract and counteroffer. (R. at 97.) 
4. Katie Jenkins is an employee of Cardinal 
Health. She is not employed by Walter. Ms. Jenkins was not 
asked, nor did she consent to act on Walter's behalf in 
connection with his personal affairs. (R at 524.) 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Berkuses advance three arguments in support of 
their appeal. First, the trial court allegedly erred in 
concluding that Janet Olch was not an agent for the Berkuses. 
Second, the trial court allegedly erred in concluding that 
Janet Olch did not have knowledge of the Berkuses' revocation 
of their counteroffer before she communicated Walter's 
acceptance. Finally, the trial court allegedly erred in 
concluding that the memo containing the Berkuses' revocation 
was received after Walter's acceptance. The Berkuses' 
arguments are without merit. 
A. Janet Olch Served as Walter's Agent and not as 
an Agent for the Berkuses, 
The record demonstrates that the Berkuses' real 
estate agent was Jon Olch and that the brokerage company was 
Bald Eagle Realty. The record also demonstrates that Walter's 
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real estate agent was Janet Olch. The record is void of any 
admissible evidence to the contrary. 
The Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Listing 
Contract & Agency Disclosures specifically identify the various 
agency relationships among the parties. The affidavits and 
deposition transcripts also uniformly establish that Janet Olch 
served only as Walter's agent, Jon Olch served only as the 
Berkuses' agent, and Bald Eagle Realty served as the brokerage 
company. The Berkuses failed to present any evidence that 
Janet Olch served as a "dual agent" or in any capacity other 
than Walter's agent. 
B. Janet Olch did not have Knowledge of the 
Berkuses/ Attempt to Revoke their Counteroffer 
Until After she Communicated Walter's 
Acceptance. 
The events at issue occurred between 2:02 p.m. and 
3:25 p.m. on Thursday, January 27, 1994. The Berkuses 
speculate that during this hour and twenty-three minutes, Jon 
Olch told Janet Olch that the counteroffer had been revoked. 
The Berkuses' speculation is not supported by the record. 
The undisputed evidence before the trial court was 
that Walter informed Janet Olch that the Berkuses' counteroffer 
was accepted "as is." This communication occurred at 1:55 
p.m., before Mr. Berkus called Bald Eagle Realty to revoke the 
counteroffer. (R. at 98.) Janet informed Jon Olch a few 
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minutes later that Walter had accepted the counteroffer. (R. 
at 125.) At approximately 3:12 p.m., Walter faxed his signed 
acceptance to Janet Olch. (R. at 125.) At about 3:25 p.m., 
Janet notified Jon that she had received the written acceptance 
and that they had a deal. (Id.) It was only then that Jon 
informed Janet that the Berkuses had decided to take their 
counteroffer "off the table" for 24 hours. (R. at 126, 512-13 
& 517-18.) There is no testimony or exhibits to the contrary. 
C, The Memo of Revocation was not Received by 
Walter Until After he had Accepted the 
Counteroffer. 
The record demonstrates that after Mr. Berkus called 
Bald Eagle Realty at approximately 2:02 p.m., Kate Doordan 
prepared a written memo to inform Walter that the counteroffer 
was being taken off the table for 24 hours. Ms. Doordan 
testified that she initially was unsuccessful in faxing the 
memo to Walter. (R. at 521.) When Ms. Doordan received a 
second telecopy number, she faxed the memo to Walter. This 
occurred at approximately 3:25 p.m. (JEd.) The fax was not 
received by Walter until approximately 4:25 p.m. because it had 
been stored in the memory of the telecopy machine due to prior 
faxes. (R. at 524-25.) Thus, the memo of revocation was not 
received until after Walter's acceptance had been communicated 
to Jon Olch, the Berkuses' agent. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST THE BERKUSES 
It is appropriate for summary judgment to be granted 
when reasonable minds could not differ on the facts to be 
determined from the evidence presented. Olympus Hills Shopping 
Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 
445, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 
(Utah 1995); Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah 
1992). The mere existence of issues of fact does not preclude 
summary judgment. Instead, the issues must be material to the 
dispute. Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983); 
Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 
1982) . 
In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-
moving party must present admissible evidence. Utah R. Civ. 
Pro. 56(e); Norton, 669 P.2d at 859. The non-moving party is 
not entitled to rely upon speculation and conjecture. E.g., 
Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co., 889 P.2d 1382, 1388 (Utah Ct. 
App.), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995); First Security 
Bank v. Jones, 794 P.2d 679, 681 (Mont. 1990). Moreover, if 
the trial judge is the ultimate trier of fact and both parties 
move for summary judgment, then summary judgment is appropriate 
196X103494 4 8 
even though conflicting inferences are possible. AID Ins. Co. 
v. Armstrong, 811 P.2d 507 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991). 
In this case, the Berkuses did not come forward with 
any admissible evidence to create genuine issues of fact upon 
which reasonable minds could differ. Instead, they came 
forward with speculation and conjecture. The trial judge, the 
ultimate trier of fact,2 rejected the Berkuses' 
unsubstantiated conjecture and entered summary judgment for 
Walter. The judgment was appropriate and should be affirmed by 
this Court. 
A. Janet Olch was not the Berkuses' Agent. 
The Berkuses' first argument turns on the issue of 
whether Walter's agent was Bald Eagle Realty or Janet Olch. 
The Berkuses' assert that Walter's agent was Bald Eagle Realty 
or, alternatively, that Janet Olch was their agent as well as 
Walter's agent. Their argument is contrary to (1) the express 
written agreements; (2) the parties' course of conduct; and (3) 
the law. 
The parties created their agency relationships by 
express written agreements which provide in relevant part as 
follows: 
2Walter's claim of specific performance seeks an equitable 
remedy. Consequently, the parties did not request a trial by 
jury. 
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The Seller hereby grants the Company [Bald 
Eagle Realty], including Jon Olch as agent 
for the Company (the "Agent") . . . the 
Exclusive Right to Sell, Lease or Exchange 
. . . the property . . . . The Agent 
hereby agrees to use reasonable efforts to 
find a buyer . . . 
. . . [t]he Seller authorizes the following 
to act as subagents for the Seller: 
HD Agent and Principal/Branch Broker 
U All agents affiliated with Company 
D all other brokerages. 
(R. at 129.) 
At the signing of this Contract the listing 
agent, Jon Olch, represents ID Seller 
U Buyer, and the selling agent Janet Olch 
represents Seller Buyer. 
(R. at 133.) Under the parties' contracts, the Berkuses 
specifically declined to authorize other agents affiliated with 
Bald Eagle Realty (including Janet Olch) to act on their 
behalf. Likewise, Walter acknowledged that Jon Olch and Bald 
Eagle Realty were acting on behalf of the Berkuses, but not on 
his behalf. Consequently, the information communicated to Bald 
Eagle Realty did not serve as notice to Walter until it was 
communicated to him or his designated agent. 
The parties and their agents acknowledge that they 
viewed Janet Olch as Walter's agent, and Jon Olch as the 
Berkuses' agent. (R. at 124, 126, 129-36, 559 & 615.) For 
example, the Berkuses dealt solely with Jon Olch and Bald Eagle 
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Realty. They did not speak with Janet Olch regarding the 
counteroffer. (See R. at 126, 309-10, 559.) Similarly, 
Walter's communications were through Janet Olch, not Jon Olch 
or Bald Eagle Realty. (See R. at 124-26.) When it came time 
to communicate their revocation, the Berkuses did not call 
Janet Olch. Instead, Mr. Berkus called Jon Olch. When Jon was 
unavailable, Mr. Berkus requested that Kate Doordan act on 
Jon's behalf to communicate the revocation to Walter or his 
agent. (R. at 559-60.) Mr. Berkus' conduct was consistent 
with the uncontroverted evidence that Janet Olch served as 
Walter's agent, and Jon Olch served as the Berkuses' agent. 
Moreover, the law supports the conclusion that the 
parties were represented by separate real estate agents. In 
order for Bald Eagle Realty to act as an agent for both buyer 
and seller, the parties are required to execute a written 
agency agreement permitting such dual representation and 
establishing a "limited agency."3 See Administrative Rules, 
Division of Real Estate, Utah Department of Commerce, R162-
3Even if a "limited agency" arrangement were to have been 
created, by law, both Jon Olch and Janet Olch would have been 
required to act independently in order to avoid possible 
conflicts of interest and were ethically prohibited from 
disclosing certain information from their principals. 
Administrative Rules, Utah Department of Commerce, R162-
6.2.16.3.1(b) & (c). (R. at 198.) Imputation, under these 
circumstances, would be improper. 
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6.1.11.3 SL R162-6.2.16.3 (1994). (R. 191-99.) While the 
Berkuses agreed that Bald Eagle Realty would serve as their 
brokerage company, Walter did not. The Berkuses also declined 
to allow agents affiliated with Bald Eagle Realty to act on 
their behalf. Without an express agreement, an agency or 
subagency relationship is not created. See Restatement 
(Second) of Agency 1(1) (1958). 
Janet Olch was merely an independent contractor 
associated with Bald Eagle Realty, not an employee to whom 
knowledge might be imputed. (R. at 123.) See Larsen v. 
Christensen. 21 Utah 2d 219, 443 P.2d 402, 403 (1968) 
(independent contractor's acts not imputed to contracting 
party); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2 & Cmt.6 (1958) 
(independent contractors are not necessarily agents for 
contracting party). 
B. Janet Olch was not Informed of the Berkuses' 
Revocation of the Counteroffer Until After 
she Conveyed Walter'a Acceptance. 
It is well-established law that once the offeree has 
exercised his power to create a contract by accepting an offer, 
a purported revocation is ineffective. See Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 42(c) (1981). In making an offer, the 
offeror may specify the manner in which the offer must be 
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accepted. Crane v. Timberbrook Village Ltd., 774 P.2d 3, 4 
(Utah App. Ct. 1989). 
In this case, the Real Estate Purchase Contract 
defines an acceptance to have occurred when the counteroffer is 
signed and communicated to the Berkuses' agent. (R. at 63.) 
Walter fully complied with this manner of acceptance before he 
was notified of the Berkuses' attempt to revoke the 
counteroffer. On Thursday, at 1:55 p.m., Walter told Janet 
Olch that the counteroffer was accepted "as is." Janet then 
informed Jon Olch that Walter had accepted the counteroffer. 
At 2:50 p.m., Walter signed the counteroffer, and at 3:12 p.m., 
faxed the acceptance to Janet. (R. 138, 125.) At 3:25 p.m., 
Janet informed Jon that she had received Walter's signed 
acceptance. It was only then that she learned the Berkuses 
wanted to revoke their counteroffer. (R. at 125-26.) 
1. There is no admissible evidence to support 
the Berkuses' conclusion that Jon Olch 
called Janet Olch prior to 3;25 p.m. 
The Berkuses contend that the trial court erred in 
entering summary judgment because there is "compelling 
circumstantial evidence" that Walter's agent, Janet Olch, was 
informed of the Berkuses' revocation before she communicated 
Walter's acceptance. The alleged circumstantial evidence is 
not evidence but sheer speculation and conjecture. The 
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uncontradicted evidence is that Janet Olch was not informed of 
the attempted revocation prior to communicating Walter's 
acceptance to Mr. Olch. (R. at 660-61, 662, 668-69, 673-77.) 
According to the Berkuses, Mr. Berkus called Kate 
Doordan at 2:02 p.m. and during this six minute call told Ms. 
Doordan that he wanted to temporarily revoke the counteroffer. 
That conversation, by the Berkuses' math, ended at 2:07 p.m. 
Ms. Doordan, immediately (in fact during the last minute of her 
call with Mr. Berkus) called and reached Jon Olch on his 
cellular telephone. Jon Olch then, in his 2:11 p.m. 
conversation with Janet Olch, communicated the revocation to 
Janet. The Berkuses' story is not supported by the record. 
First, Mr. Berkus' call to Kate Doordan terminated at 
2:08 p.m., not 2:07 p.m. A six minute telephone call starting 
at 2:02 lasts until 2:08. 
Second, the Berkuses' allegation that the 2:07 p.m. 
call to Jon Olch was made by Kate Doordan is not supported by 
any evidence. While Jon Olch's telephone records show an 
incoming call at 2:07 p.m., contrary to Berkuses' assertion, 
those records do not document the origin of the call. (R. at 
689-90.) To conclude that this call had to be made by Kate 
Doordan is pure conjecture. 
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Third, Ms. Doordan's testimony does not support the 
Berkuses' story. Ms. Doordan, notwithstanding counsel for 
Berkuses' best efforts, testified that she had no recollection 
of the exact timing of her conversation with Jon Olch, but does 
not believe it occurred immediately after she spoke to Mr. 
Berkus* (See R. at 615; Addendum "A" attached hereto.4) Ms. 
Doordan also testified that she did not contact Janet Olch 
regarding the Berkuses' desire to revoke their counteroffer 
prior to 3:25 p.m. (R. at 682-84.) The fact that Jon Olch may 
have received a one minute telephone call from someone at some 
unidentified location at 2:07 p.m. does not create a reasonable 
inference that Janet Olch received notice of the Berkuses' 
revocation prior to Walter's acceptance. 
Fourth, the Berkuses make much of the fact that the 
Olches are entitled to receive a commission on the sale of the 
property if Walter prevails in this case. The Berkuses 
therefore conclude that the Olches are lying. Even assuming 
financial gain was sufficient to create an issue of fact, which 
4Excerpts from the deposition of Ms. Doordan which were 
cited to the trial court but are not included in the record are 
attached to this brief and included as Addendum "A." (See R. at 
649.) 
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it is not,5 the incentive for misrepresenting the facts cuts 
against the Berkuses. The Third-Party Complaint filed by the 
Berkuses against Jon Olch, Bald Eagle Realty and Kate Doordan 
seeks unspecified damages for breach of fiduciary duty in 
failing to timely notify Walter of the revocation. 
Consequently, from a liability standpoint, there is great 
financial incentive for Jon Olch to simply state that he 
informed Janet Olch of the Berkuses' revocation prior to 
Walter's acceptance. This would absolve him and his company of 
liability to the Berkuses. The fact that Jon Olch testified as 
he did creates an inference of honesty, not dishonesty. 
2• Kate Doordan was not Janet Qlch's agent. 
The Berkuses argue that Kate Doordan served as Janet 
Olch's assistant. The Berkuses conclude that if Kate Doordan 
was Janet Olch's assistant, then Ms. Doordan was Janet's agent, 
and, therefore, notice to Ms. Doordan constituted notice to 
Walter. Again, there is no evidence presented to substantiate 
these conclusions. 
5The Berkuses allege that witness credibility is a fact 
question for trial. While this is generally true, there must be 
an evidentiary dispute before credibility becomes an issue. 
Here, all the fact witnesses have sworn under penalty of perjury 
that Jon did not contact Janet regarding the Berkuses' 
revocation until 3:25 p.m. There is no evidentiary dispute to 
be resolved by evaluating a witness' credibility. 
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Kate Doordan was an employee of Bald Eagle Realty. 
She had a written contract with Bald Eagle Realty and provided 
office support to Bald Eagle Realty. (R. at 685.) She was 
paid by Bald Eagle Realty, she answered only to Jon Olch. She 
did not answer to Janet Olch, and she did not represent Janet 
Olch's clients. (R. at 685-86.) Instead, Ms. Doordan's basic 
duties were that of a secretary/receptionist. (R. at 686-87.) 
(Id.) She had no ability to make decisions or to negotiate 
contracts on behalf of Janet Olch. (R at 686.) The fact that 
Ms. Doordan performed clerical services for some of the 
affiliates of Bald Eagle Realty, including Janet Olch, does not 
make her an agent for Janet Olch that would then impute Ms. 
Doordan's knowledge to Walter. 
Moreover, Mr. Berkuses' own testimony and 
actions confirm his understanding that notice to Ms. Doordan 
was not notice to Walter. He states that he called Bald Eagle 
to inform "our agent, Jonathan Olch, of our decision." (R. at 
559.) After discovering that Mr. Olch was not in the office, 
he told Ms. Doordan "to immediately fax plaintiff my 
revocation," and he "was adamant that she understand the 
urgency of the matter." (R. at 560.) Mr. Berkus understood 
that communication of his revocation to Ms. Doordan was not in 
any respect communication to Walter. Mr. Berkuses' testimony 
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and actions are consistent with the trial court's conclusion 
that Janet Olch was Walter's agent and Jon Olch was the 
Berkuses' agent. 
C. Walter Accepted the Counteroffer Prior to the 
Alleged Revocation at 3:25 p.m. 
Acceptance of the counteroffer required two things: 
(1) signing the counteroffer, and (2) communicating to the 
Berkuses' agent that the counteroffer was signed. The 
undisputed facts presented to the trial court demonstrated that 
Walter's agent, Janet Olch, communicated to the Berkuses' 
agent, Jon Olch, that Walter had accepted the counteroffer "as 
is." This occurred at 1:55 p.m. (R. at 98, 125.) Walter 
signed the acceptance at 2:50 p.m. (R. at 138.) The faxed 
copy of Walter's signed acceptance was received by Janet Olch 
at approximately 3:12 p.m., and communicated to Jon Olch at 
3:25 p.m. (R. at 125. ) 
Acceptance under the contract was completed at 2:50 
p.m. when both requirements of the contract had occurred. The 
fact that Berkuses' agent was notified of the acceptance first, 
before Walter had actually signed the counteroffer, is of no 
legal significance. The parties agreed that, in either 
sequence, the required notice was given and the required 
signature was affixed. Alternatively, the counteroffer was 
accepted at 3:25 p.m. when the signed acceptance was received 
196U03494 4 1 ° 
and communicated to Jon Olch. Under either view, Walter's 
acceptance occurred before he received notice of the Berkuses' 
revocation. 
The Berkuses contend that the memo of revocation 
prepared by Kate Doordan was received by Walter at 3:25 p.m. 
Thus, they argue that if the acceptance occurred at 3:25 p.m., 
and not 2:50 p.m., there is a genuine issue as to whether the 
memo arrived before the acceptance was actually communicated. 
Again, the Berkuses' argument misses the point. The trial 
court's entry of summary judgment is appropriate since the memo 
of revocation was received by Walter after 3:25 p.m. (R. at 
524-25.) 
The rule is "an offeree's power of acceptance is 
terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror a 
manifestation of the intention not to enter into the proposed 
contract." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 42 (1981). 
However, revocation is ineffective if received after 
acceptance. Id. § 42 (c). In this case, Walter, the offeree, 
did not receive the revocation until well after his agent 
undisputedly had accepted the counteroffer. (R. at 125, 524-
25.) Therefore, the Berkuses' revocation was ineffective. 
The Berkuses erroneously assume that communication 
with Katie Jenkins, secretary for Cardinal Health, was notice 
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to Walter. The Berkuses maintain that Kate Doordan read Ms. 
Jenkins the memo of revocation at the time she faxed it to 
Walter's business office. The trial court found that this 
issue was not material since any notice to Katie Jenkins, 
whether it came before or after Walter's acceptance, was not 
notice to Walter. 
Receipt by Katie Jenkins, an administrative assistant 
of Cardinal Health, was not notice to Walter. Ms. Jenkins was 
an employee of Cardinal Health. (R. at 524.) Although she 
assisted Walter in his official work at Cardinal Health, she 
was not Walter's personal agent. At best, she was merely a 
messenger who could relay information to Walter. See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 68, illus. 2 (1981) 
(receipt of telegraph by messenger boy is not receipt by 
offeree). Even if Ms. Jenkins were considered Walter's agent 
in some sense, notice to her was not notice to Walter for all 
purposes. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 268 (c) (1958) 
(the principal is not bound by a notification directed towards 
an agent whose duties or apparent duties have no connection 
with the subject matter to which the notification relates); 
Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of President of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day-Saints, 534 P.2d 887, 890 (Utah 
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1975) (notice to church employee was not notice to church in 
view of employee's merely clerical duties). 
Walter has never authorized Katie Jenkins to act on 
his behalf in connection with his personal real estate matters, 
(R. at 524,) It has long been the rule in Utah that: 
Notice to an agent is notice to its 
principal is not applicable unless notice 
has reference to business in which the 
agent is engaged under authority (the 
principal) and is pertinent to matters 
coming within the authority; . . . Notice 
to or knowledge of a mere ministerial 
agent, clerk or servant will not be imputed 
to the principal. 
Independent Oil and Gas Co. v. Shelton, 79 Utah 384, 6 P.2d 
1027 (1932); accord 3 C.J.S. Agency § 436, pp. 303-304 (1973) 
("Knowledge of a servant, or one performing ministerial duties 
for another, will not be charged to the latter"). Notice to 
Katie Jenkins, as a matter of law, was not notice to Walter. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Both trial judges properly concluded that Walter was 
entitled to summary judgment against the Berkuses. Based upon 
the uncontroverted evidence, Judge Iwasaki found that Janet 
Olch was the agent for Walter, and Jon Olch and Bald Eagle 
Realty were the agents for the Berkuses. Judge Iwasaki's 
finding is substantiated by the testimony of Janet Olch, Jon 
Olch and Kate Doordan, together with the Real Estate Purchase 
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Contract and the Listing Contract & Agency Disclosures. There 
was absolutely no evidence presented by the Berkuses to 
demonstrate that Janet Olch was acting in any capacity other 
than Walter's agent. Therefore, the trial court properly found 
that knowledge to Bald Eagle Realty or Jon Olch could not be 
imputed to Janet Olch or Walter. 
The trial court also properly found that there was no 
evidence upon which reasonable minds could differ as to the 
fact that Janet Olch did not have knowledge of the Berkuses' 
attempt to revoke their counteroffer until after she had 
communicated Walter's acceptance. The "parade of horrors" 
presented by the Berkuses (e.g., phantom telephone calls, the 
inferences that calls had to occur due to "a sense of urgency", 
and motivations to misrepresent facts in order to earn a 
commission) are pure conjecture. Every witness testified in 
their deposition or affidavit that at the time Janet Olch 
communicated Walter's acceptance to Jon Olch, she did not have 
knowledge of the Berkuses' attempt to revoke their 
counteroffer. 
Finally, the trial court properly found that Walter 
did not have constructive or actual knowledge of the Berkuses' 
attempt to revoke their counteroffer prior to his acceptance. 
Based upon the uncontroverted evidence, Judge Noel found that 
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the memo of revocation was not received until well after 3:25 
p.m. Judge Noel also correctly found that Katie Jenkins was 
not an agent for Walter, but rather an employee of Cardinal 
Health. Therefore, any notice to Ms. Jenkins was not imputed 
to Walter. Based upon these uncontroverted facts, the trial 
court properly found that Walter was entitled to summary 
judgment of specific performance- Therefore, this Court should 
deny the Berkuses' appeal and affirm the trial court's Order 
Granting Partial Summary Judgment for Plaintiff dated December 
9, 1994, Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
dated October 26, 1995, and Judgment of Specific Performance 
dated December 14, 1995. This Court should also remand the 
case to the trial court for an award of attorney's fees and 
damages on the appeal bond. 
DATED this Lb — day of May, 1996. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
By: '/ ~ « ,*-.- s 
Bryon J. Benevento 
Attorneys—^ or Appellee 
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Addendum A 
MR. BENEVENTO: Objection, speculation. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I'll join in that. 
Q (BY MR. ANDERSON) Let me ask you this, do you have 
a distinct recollection of not calling Jon Olch immediately 
after Mr. Berkus called you or is it something that you just 
don't remember? 
A It's something that I just don't remember. 
Q Let me invite your attention back to Exhibit 8. 
Could you give that to her, Counsel? 
And I'd like to invite your attention to the second 
page, please, to the date January 27th, 1994, do you see that 
about two thirds of the way down? 
A Yes. 
Q And according to Mr. Olch's cellular phone record a 
2:07 that day he had an incoming call from Park City, is that 
right? 
MR. BENEVENTO: Objection, foundation. 
Q (BY MR. ANDERSON) Is that what that appears to 
reflect? 
MR. BENEVENTO: Objection, the document speaks for 
itself. It's a matter of phone records. 
MR. ANDERSON: She can answer that. 
MR. BENEVENTO: It's self-servicing. 
MR. WILLIAMS: If you can answer it. Go ahead. If 
you have no personal knowledge, indicate so. 
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THE WITNESS: Where do you draw the line on personal 
knowledge, because Ifm reading it here and because I knew it? 
MR. WILLIAMS: If you understand the exhibit and 
understand what it signifies. 
THE WITNESS: Then Ifm sorry, John, would you just 
ask me the question again? 
Q (BY MR. ANDERSON) Sure. Does it appear to reflect 
that at 2:07 p.m. Mr. Olch received on his cellular phone an 
incoming call from Park City? 
A It does but I don't understand the... 
Q Let me ask the question. 
A Let me, as long as I'm going to be answering this. 
At 2:07 Park City, Utah, incoming 640-0244. It doesn't say 
where, oh, it says to call origin--
MR. BENEVENTO: Again I renew my objection on 
foundation. 
Q (BY MR. ANDERSON) Incoming from Park City? 
A Yes, okay, under call origin it says Park City. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Let's me also join in that objection 
based on her answer. 
Q (BY MR. ANDERSON) And having looked at that at 
entry does that help refresh your recollection as to whether 
you called Mr. Olch right after you terminated your call with 
Mr. Berkus? 
A No. 
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Q And what did you tell Jon at 2:15? 
A I don't remember that conversation. 
Q It indicates that you informed him of the Berkus 
call/ is that accurate? 
A Yes, it does. 
A Do you recall having informed Mr. Olch of that fac 
about five or ten minutes earlier? 
A Earlier than what? 
Q Than 2:15? 
A No. 
Q What did Mr. Olch say in response to what you told 
him? 
A I do not remember. 
Q No recollection whatsoever? 
A Honestly, John, I cannot remember what he said. 
Q What did you say? 
A I do not remember that. 
Q Did you ask Mr. Olch during that conversation what 
you should do? 
A I do not remember. 
Q Do you remember any aspect of the conversation? 
A No. 
Q Do you recall whether he was surprised at the 
information that you had imparted to him? 
MR. BENEVENTO: Objection, speculation as to it 
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